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Abstract
A core historical narrative about anthropological knowledge is that it is cre-
ated in relations with others, with fieldwork seen as ‘a series of apprenticeships’
whose success is determined by the quality of those relations. An ethnographer
connects with the conditions of those studied in ‘circulating exchange’; but on
leaving the field a degree of closure is needed to formulate and communicate
anthropological knowledge. These obligations and requirements in the creation
of knowledge entail attachment and detachment, carrying the seeds of betrayal
that can compromise that knowledge. Each epistemological enquiry has its own
core ethical imperatives, but as long as knowledge posits a knower, ‘the self of
the knower will be at epistemological issue’. In discussing the ethics of knowl-
edge creation I consider the following questions, among others: To what extent
is the creation of a particular kind of ethical and epistemic person required for
knowledge? How can ethnography produce knowledge about others without be-
traying them? Can relations of knowledge exchange confer or withhold ‘rights
to speak’? Is it possible that unethical relations may destroy or hold up the
unfolding of knowledge? And are there circumstances in which it is unethical to
disclose knowledge?
Key words: Ethics of knowledge creation; Types of knowers; Epistemolog-
ical enquiry; Knowledge exchange; Knowledge unfolding; Knowledge disclosure
1 Introduction
‘Why does an epistemology need an ethics?’ Daston and Galison begin with this
question in their study of objectivity as a scientific concept. Their answer speaks to
the anthropologist’s predicament: epistemology and ethics are intertwined, because a
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way of being is at the same time a way of knowing (2010, p. 39, 4). It follows then that
as long as knowledge posits a knower, ‘the self of the knower will be at epistemological
issue’ (ibid., p. 40). This linking of the knower to that which is known leads to the
cultivation of a distinctive scientific self in whom knowing and knower converge.
This convergence is to be found at the heart of the historical narrative about an-
thropological knowledge, which is considered to be created in relations with others,
forged in fieldwork as ‘a series of apprenticeships’ whose success is determined by the
quality of those relations (Jenkins 1994, p. 442). The ethnographer engages in ‘cir-
culating exchange’ with those studied, living with them as a ‘participant observer’.
In this received view, which nonetheless has variants, anthropological knowledge cre-
ation is seen as grounded in an ethnographic encounter whose ethical perspective is
the basis of a methodology of understanding. As Jenkins writes, we understand oth-
ers only by engaging with them in practical activities, in which knowledge itself is
created. This knowledge does not exist independently, prior to the interactions, as
objective, uninvolved, and there for the taking. Much of social life is practical, em-
bodied in habits and dispositions, and behaviour is ‘constructed or improvised’ on the
basis of these habits; it is not made up ‘of rule-governed responses to stimuli’. Social
actors are thus able to generate ‘an infinite number of practices adapted to endlessly
changing situations, without this basis ever being constituted as explicit principles’
(Jenkins, 1994, p. 439). This is the territory of Bourdieu’s (1977) theory of practice,
as Jenkins reminds us.
To some extent, Carrithers (1992) follows a similar trajectory, in that he rejects
notions of understanding as grounded in pre-existing structures. He also denies that
knowledge is gained from observations of enacted meaning. Instead, he aims to demon-
strate that ethnographic understanding is achieved through intersubjectivity that goes
beyond words. His work thus falls into the spectrum of existential anthropology, a
perspective that has attracted swathes of established anthropologists with impressive
sets of studies (in particular, see Jackson, 2005 and 2013; Jackson & Piette, 2017;
Ingold, 2011). Jackson defines existential anthropology as ‘an anthropology whose
object is to understand through empirical means social Being’ (Jackson, 2005, p.
xxviii). Despite the situation of the individual, he contends, the question of being is
universal (2005, p. xii). Jackson thus refuses to ontologise such notions as ‘having
culture’, ‘being oneself’ – because he rejects the notion that ‘our humanity consists
in our individual will-to-be’ (ibid.: xii). Instead, he demonstrates an ‘anthropology
of events’ by exploring critical moments, ‘moments of being’ that ‘allegorize the pre-
cariousness of all human existence’ and transform events that befall us into scenarios
of our own choosing (ibid., p. xx; (see also Josephides, 2014). For his part, Ingold
(2011), in his decidedly mobile ethnographies, emphasises movement and being alive
in the world with a distinct Heideggerian flavour.
While Hastrup and Hervik (1994, p. 1) accept the significance of autobiography
and the situatedness of the anthropologist in the creation of anthropological knowl-
edge, they wish to ‘demystify’ subjectivity – by which they mean an obsession with
the self. The starting point for anthropology, they write, is not the self but the field.
Experience trumps dialogue in the field – in fact the field is experienced as performed
(ibid., pp. 2, 3). What is internalised in fieldwork is not a culture as a given text
to be interpreted (despite Geertz), nor a system of cognitive categories (malgré Lévi-
Strauss). Rather, it is a holistic, total social experience comprising of thought, feelings
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and emotions. Nonetheless, it could be argued that a precondition for scholarship is
a shift from the ‘implicit knowing’ of how people know their own culture, to explicit
knowledge. It is not enough just to ‘let the natives speak for themselves’. Analysis
and reflections are needed for scholarly knowledge (Josephides, 2008a).
The above is just a brief review of how anthropologists have reflected on the
creation of their discipline’s knowledge. Despite variations, their accounts have in
common a stress on the person of the knower, the importance of the ethical con-
ditions of knowing, and the relations that make knowing possible. Does knowledge
creation link the knower and knowledge with value, virtue and goodness? And can
the content and ownership of knowledge be linked to the conditions of its creation? In
what follows I begin with an overview of philosophical and anthropological perspec-
tives on knowledge and ethics and their relationship. Then I move to the creation
of the knower, considered from four perspectives. Finally, I discuss the future of
anthropology beyond primary sites. In a conclusion I revisit the notion of betrayal.
2 Knowledge Creation: Philosophical Perspectives
Philosophical debates on knowledge tend to link knowledge with value, virtue, and
goodness (see Josephides, 2015). They combine the ability to think rationally with
a reflective attitude about living well. When Aristotle outlined the five intellectual
virtues that can be called knowledge (techne, episteme, phronesis, sophia and nous),
he insisted that they were powers of the mind that are ‘truth-apt’ (Chappell 2014, p.
271), but also stressed that the aim of his enquiry was not to attain knowledge about
what excellence [virtue] was, but to become good [virtuous] (Chappell, 2014, p. 24).
Some ambivalence remained, however (especially for Plato), around the question of
whether virtue as knowledge can be learned, or if it is more akin to ‘correct opinion’,
possessed as a gift from the gods (Plato, 1997, pp. 888–97).
Modern philosophy of knowledge identifies three types of knowledge: propositional
knowledge (knowing-that, factual or descriptive knowledge), experiential knowledge,
and knowing-how (practical knowledge and including moral knowledge) (Chappell.
2014, pp. 270-1). All three types of knowledge carry ‘epistemic credit’, which can be
claimed only with the relevant knowledge-how, experimental knowledge, or proposi-
tional knowledge (Chappell, 2014, p. 265). Chappell (ibid., p. 269) reminds us of two
points that are relevant to the current enquiry: first, even scientific knowledge is not
exclusively propositional (Daston et al., 2010, also underline this point); second, any
argument to the effect that systematic moral thinking must be based on knowledge
of the good makes ethics into propositional knowledge (2014, p. 277). Chappell’s
subsequent statement, that the ‘capacity to feel ourselves into things’ ‘is the basis of
our understanding of and connectedness to the world’ (2014, p. 289), puts him in the
camp of many anthropologists. Though not directly addressing the ethics of knowl-
edge exchange, Chappell moves in this direction when he defines ‘objectual knowledge’
in terms that recall the anthropologist’s stock-in-trade: knowledge of objects, which
may be material or abstract; or dispositions (such as virtues) (Chappell, 2014, p. 284).
Objectual knowledge is ‘value-loaded’, a ‘humble and unending pilgrimage towards the
demands set by an external reality’, while the aim of propositional knowledge is con-
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trol and domination (ibid., pp. 288-9). The trajectory of objectual knowledge recalls
the description of fieldwork as a ‘series of apprenticeships’ (Jenkins, 1994, p. 442).
Chappell reasoned further in terms that appear to describe the anthropologist’s craft:
The point [as philosopher Iris Murdoch outlines] is to approach some-
thing outside oneself, something indefinitely demanding and in some ways
mysterious, and to try to be both truthful and illuminating in one’s un-
derstanding of it. This exercise . . . is something that requires humility,
patience, persistence, imagination, and resourcefulness from the inquirer.
And notably, it is part of the way things are that the seeker after objectual
knowledge never completes his quest; there is always more to know about
any object, especially about any complex and interesting object.
Another writer, a novelist this time, outlines the difference between knowledge and
judgement. In his epistolary novel on the Roman Emperor Augustus, John Williams
(2003 [1971], p. 128) has Maecenas write the following chastisement in a letter to
Livy:
[It] seems to me that the moralist is the most useless and contemptible
of creatures. He . . . would expend his energies upon making judgments
rather than upon gaining knowledge, for the reason that judgment is easy
and knowledge is difficult.
Ethnographers suspend judgement during fieldwork, simply living and focusing on
the analysis of experience. Since knowledge is entangled in relations and engagements
between people, the ‘capacity to feel ourselves into things . . . is the basis of our
understanding of and connectedness to the world’ (Chappell, 2014, p. 289). The
person and ethics meet most productively in the creation of the knower, a multiple
personage I discuss in a later section. But first, some background on anthropological
knowledge.
3 Ethnography, Theory, and Knowledge Creation
as ‘Partial Connections’
Historically anthropological knowledge was built on the findings of fieldwork, used to
construct ethnographic monographs on which theorizations were grounded. Over the
years there have been refinements of the understandings of the mechanics of this rela-
tionship. To a large extent these changes were in response to perceptions of creative
and epistemological gaps between ethnographic and anthropological knowledge and
redefinitions of fieldwork itself (see e.g. Josephides, 2008; Ingold, 2013; Rabinow, 2003;
Rabinow et al., 2013), but also reflected shifts in ethical stances and critiques of au-
thenticity and legitimacy levelled at anthropology’s knowledge-building. They ranged
from arguments that question the possibility of representation from epistemological,
political and ideological perspectives to questions of the rights of the anthropologist to
speak at all (see, e.g., Clifford, 1986). In Ingold’s view, ethnography (understood as
the monograph, not the fieldwork) and anthropology are antithetical ways of knowing,
the first creating a ‘transformational space for generous, open-ended comparative and
critical enquiry’ and the second turning participant observation into qualitative data
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‘to be analysed in terms of an exogenous body of theory’ (2013, pp. 4-5). Ingold’s aim
was to refute notions of the separation between knowing and being, or data-collecting
and theory building. His insightful comments open up a discussion on what is the
field, what are different ‘fields’ corresponding to different ways of creating knowledge,
and what is the role of fieldwork in contemporary anthropology (on the last point,
see also Rabinow et al., 2013, below).
A significant current in anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s, but particularly
prevalent in Melanesian ethnography, was represented by followers of Dumont’s view
of hierarchical encompassment (Barnes et al., 1985; Iteanu, 1984), according to which
each culture was a totality containing its own unique version of the truth. Marilyn
Strathern, who was not particularly drawn to notions of the unifying aspects of cul-
ture, proceeded instead to deconstruct the edifice and identify ‘partial connections’
between its elements (Strathern, 1991). ‘Partial connections’ were Wittgensteinian-
type family resemblances that accounted for cultural divergences within a region that
shared a common historical origin. Strathern saw the ‘postmodernist’ development as
a growing realization of anthropology’s major problem: to overcome its own referen-
tial impossibility. If anthropology understood itself as the social science that describes
other cultures, then its mission was severely compromised by its acknowledgment that
all its descriptive terms had their own cultural context (‘meaning’) in the describer’s
social world. (The discussion below draws on Strathern, 1987.) When Malinowski
first constructed the figure of ‘the lone fieldworker’ who experiences cultural otherness
as functioning wholes, he attributed his authority to his claim that he was describing
the people’s own experience and their own understanding of how their culture worked.
Malinowski, as a traveller between the two cultures, unscrambles unfamiliar habits
by contextualizing them within a culture that as a totality ‘makes sense’. A double
distance is established by the ethnography: it is premised on a disjunction between
the observer and the observed, and the writer and the reader; the latter is not invited
to share in participant observation, but merely to be convinced by an account of the
writer’s experiences. For the postmodernist this self-conscious creation of distance
and the privileging of certain voices became intellectually indefensible.
Having started with the pitfalls of representing others, postmodernist critique then
faced the problem of representation itself (see Clifford, 1986). An ethnographic mono-
graph cannot ‘represent’ an entity to a reader, because it does not describe a reality
‘out there’ that can be grasped some other way. Strathern suggested we think of an
ethnographer’s ‘conception’ of a culture to which ethnography provided a ‘connection’.
The connection was made when the ethnography evoked in the reader a ‘realisation
of an experience’ (1987, p. 3). This discussion suggests that we communicate by
analogy and share experiences in parallels.
But if ethnographers did not report on any social or cultural facts and their nar-
ratives consisted merely in evocation, what (Strathern asks) happens to comparison,
the much-vaunted project of anthropology? Well, it gives way to ‘partial connec-
tions’. Strathern imagined that Papua New Guinea Highland societies comprised
extensions of one another, their connections carried out through communications in
which people expanded, developed and contracted ideas they held (Strathern, 1987,
p. 44). Strathern did not suggest that these societies were connected as particular
manifestations of a universal or any other overarching structure; rather, each was a
‘variant of some other concrete form’ (Strathern, 1987, p. 44), evoking interactions
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without implying shared meanings or common interpretations, but rather working as
instruments of sociality (Strathern, 1987, p. 46). Analogy can work only through
an investigation of how one item is substituted for another in people’s thoughts and
actions. Images and artefacts are ‘enablements’ that extend the capability of the ac-
tor. In this understanding, the proper job of anthropological knowledge is to describe
cultures by attention to the substitution of meanings within symbols, necessitating
that the ethnographer remain a ‘two way traveller’ who thinks one society through
another. Strathern questions whether human subjects are necessarily the subject of
the research. She suggests instead that the subjects of the research are the products
of people’s interactions (2000, p. 294), including interactions between researchers and
those studied. (For a critique of ‘the new Melanesian ethnography’, see Josephides,
1991.)
4 Ethics: Anthropological Perspectives
The relationship between knowledge and virtue, or virtue ethics has been increasingly
debated by anthropologists (e.g. Faubion, 2011; Laidlaw, 2014). James Laidlaw
(2014, p. 52) sets out the various relevant concepts: deontological, consequentialist
and virtue ethics pit phronesis (prudence) against sophia (wisdom), and judgement or
practical reason combine the capability of rational thinking with a type of knowledge
that is not just skill but the ability to reflect about living well. Thus knowledge
and ethics, or virtue, appear as subsets of each other, impossible to separate either
methodologically or substantively.
For James Laidlaw (2014, pp. 44-45), ethics is reflective evaluation. To acquire
knowledge about the lives of others, a person must gain ‘an imaginative understanding’
from the ethical concepts of those others and ‘learn to use and think with those
concepts and participate in the form of life’, but without ‘having to adopt its concepts
and values as his or her own’ (2014, p. 45). This is the ethnographic stance, a variant
of ‘participant observation’ which requires that we take seriously the forms of life
we describe, learning from them in such a way that they become ‘resources in our
own critical reflection and self-constitution’ (2014, p. 46). This is a precondition
for anthropology as ethical practice (see also Kresse, 2007), and a reason for being
concerned with the person in any discussion of knowledge, as will be outlined below
in the four figures of the knower.
A crucial aspect of anthropological ethics is the mode of access to field sites,
as these are the homes of people studied. This is especially sensitive when ethno-
graphic research is in dystopian spaces. Pradeep Jeganathan describes the worst of
such spaces, places of torture, and how ethical practices in these spaces constitute
the person of the anthropologist, who becomes a particular kind of knower because
of this ethical construction. An ethical and epistemological link can be drawn with
Stengers’ (2011) discussion of ‘obligations and requirements’. But Jeganathan turns
to Lorraine Daston’s argument, in which the empirical is secured by three modes of
knowing, testimony, facticity and novelty: ‘testimony works through trust, facticity
through civility, and novelty through transformation of curiosity into a virtue’ (2005,
p. 160). The ‘investigative self’ of the researcher develops the knowledge through ‘dis-
ciplined curiosity’, in a process that Jeganathan identifies as a moral economy (2005,
p. 161). Jeganathan extends Daston’s argument to a moral economy of anthropolog-
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ical knowledge that doubles the personal and the disciplinary, through trust (2005, p.
164); trust as part of a moral economy links to the relationship between ethics and
knowledge (2005, p. 164). Jeganathan notes the difference between experimental and
experiential, and the differences in imagination and interpretation between the sci-
ences and ethnography. Anthropological truth combines a sense of ‘moral’ as ‘certain,
well-known, and well-accepted’ with the more seventeenth-century idea of ‘moral’ ‘as
“sentiment,” as disciplined affect’ (2005, p. 165).
In their introduction to the edited volume Embedding Ethics, in which Jeganathan’s
chapter appears, Lynn Meskel and Peter Pels emphasize the need for negotiation be-
tween experts and their diverse audiences. They question ‘the artifice of abstracting
ethics from scholarly practice’ and argue against a conception that ‘turns the ethical
code into a kind of “constitution” for the profession’, calling for a redefinition of the
location of anthropological expertise itself (2005, pp. 3, 7). They reject the reliance
of symbols that customarily dismiss large parts of the everyday workings of knowl-
edge and morals (ibid.), and also dismiss the ‘autonomous self’ in favour of embedded
setting and listening to local voices (2005, p. 8). Meskel and Pels are surely right
to caution against ‘disembedding ethics’ through various forms of ‘professionalist ide-
ology’, especially as it has such a deleterious effect on how anthropologists relate to
people during research (2005, p. 23).
Pels identifies the ethics concerned in the trickster’s dilemma as part of a ‘specific
technology of the (professional) self’ (Pels, 2000, p. 136). In Pels’s account, the term
‘technologies’ suggests the possibility of subterfuge rather than a developmental prac-
tice or a more general part of being a person or a self, as in the ancient Greek practices
of care of the self. Pels’s uncomfortable conclusion encourages this reading: ‘owing
public allegiance to both research sponsors and research subjects’, he argues, anthro-
pologists can show neither of them a ‘true’ face (2000, p. 137). But while it is true
that dilemmas and quandaries are legion, they are not confined to anthropologists; as
Stengers tells us, this is the fate of the practitioners of the sciences of contemporane-
ity, who share the same temporality as those about whom they produce knowledge
(Stengers, 2011, p. 378). Nonetheless, the rise of audit means that anthropologists
must learn to distinguish between ethics ‘as a set of quasi-legal principles’, the ‘ethic’
in which a set of principles is deployed, and ‘the technologies of self that make both
“ethics” and “ethic” operative’ (Pels, 2000, p. 146; see also Strathern, 2000, 2005, and
2006).
5 The Creation of the Knower
Much of this paper has been a preamble to the introduction of the knower. I begin with
a broad historical discussion, drawing mostly on Daston and Galison, on the creation
of the kind of knower necessary for a particular sort of knowing and knowledge. Then
I home in on descriptions, of varying depth and length, of four kinds of knowers: the
pure observer, the thinking man/woman, the same captured by apparatuses, and the
researcher tackling the obligations and requirements of knowledge. Finally, I consider
the anthropology of the contemporary, which goes beyond primary sites.
How do we know? (for anthropological debates, see Chua et al., 2008; Halstead et
al., 2008; Harris, 2007). Since knowledge is entangled in engagements between people,
implicit in these debates are questions about the place of the ethical in human life
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(Lambek, 2010), how an ethical life is lived, and how one constructs oneself through
ethical practices (Rabinow, 2003). Here I start with the ‘epistemic virtues’ of the
scientist as knower, then move on to some comments on four types of knowers.
In their study on the historical emergence of objectivity as a scientific concept,
Daston and Galison identify three distinct codes of epistemic virtue occurring in a his-
torical series: ‘truth-to-nature, mechanical objectivity, and trained judgment’ (2010,
p. 18). Trained judgement required classification that went beyond a fixed set of
standard criteria; an evaluative process that was not necessarily a conscious one; a
cognitive process represented as holistic; and precision (2010, p. 335). These were
the qualities of the scientist, who emerged as a new type of intellectual in the mid-
nineteenth century and needed a coherent, well-ordered self (2010, p. 217). The
history of scientific objectivity, Daston and Galison contend, is to be understood as
part and parcel of the history of the scientific self, for whom epistemic virtues were
a prerequisite for knowing the world (2010, pp. 37-39). Though objectivism split
knower and knowledge, there remained a core ethical imperative about how to do sci-
ence, which linked the mastery of scientific practices to self-mastery. These practices
– or technologies – included ‘training the senses in scientific observation, keeping lab
notebooks, drawing specimens, habitually monitoring one’s own beliefs and hypothe-
ses, quieting the will, and channeling the attention’ (2010, p. 199). Together they
forged and constituted the kinds of selves that meet the demands of epistemic virtues
(ibid.), to the extent that knowers could be reconstructed from biographical literature.
The suggestion here is that an ethos was grafted onto a scientific persona, and an eth-
ical and epistemological code became imagined as a self. In this way, ‘epistemology
and ethos fuse’ (2010, p. 204).
If ‘doing science’ moulds the scientist, may we say likewise that ‘doing ethnogra-
phy’ moulds the anthropologist? Other parallels may be drawn. Subjectivity became
feared as ‘the enemy within’, the ‘untrustworthy scientific self’ (2010, pp. 197-98),
while in the 1860s, when ‘passive observation’ came to be opposed to ‘active experi-
mentation’, the scientist had to be both ‘speculative and bold’ and a passive observer
(2010, p. 243). By the mid-twentieth century objectivity and subjectivity no longer
seemed to be opposites, but appeared more as a complementary pairing necessary
for the understanding of the workings of science (2010, p. 361). Daston and Galison
reach some bold conclusions: all epistemology begins in fear, they write. Subjectivity
is the core self, ‘the root of both knowledge and error’ (2010, p. 374), while objectivity
is a ‘sacrifice’ (ibid.), denying subjectivity out of fear of what it may reveal. A seismic
change occurs in the era of nanoculture, when in the move from representation to
presentation fidelity to nature (formerly a triple obligation: visual, epistemological,
ethical) is abandoned and nature merges with artefact in nanomanipulable images
(2010, pp. 363, 382). Scientists as knowers move from the contemplative life to the
active life of science, to the position of intervention (2010, p. 392). Ontology is not of
much interest to engineers-as-knowers, who just want to know what will work; efficacy
trumps explanations (2010, p. 303).
To extrapolate: how would ethnographies-as-tools be, rather than ethnographies-
as-evidence? (2010, p. 385). In the realm of nanomanipulation, Daston and Galison
write, ‘images are examples of right depiction – but of objects that are being made,
not found’ (2010, p. 391). This observation is reminiscent of a comment by Bruno
Latour, philosopher and anthropologist, on the relationship between truth and arte-
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fact: ‘Yes, it is true, I made it in the laboratory’ (2010a, p. 19). Ethnography as
actual, as interpretation, as tool, meshing with a new kind of knower: the engineer-
ing self. The final paragraph of Objectivity invites a comparison with anthropology.
Are images of truth-to-nature/idealized world equivalent to perceptions of the ‘noble
savage’? Is scientists’ ‘vaunted objectivity, all nature and none of us’ equivalent to
cultural relativism? Are trained judgement, images as bridges, ‘part us, part not-
us’ equivalent to the postmodernist 1980s turn of fieldwork as creating something
new? What corresponds to the latest phase of images as part tool kit and part art,
nanomanufacturers’ aesthetic objects and marketing tags? (2010, p. 415). These new
creations of knowledge correspond in anthropology to secondary fieldwork, moving to
new sites, and engaging in the anthropology of the contemporary (see discussion of
Rabinow et al. below).
6 Four types of Knowers:
The pure observer; the thinking man/woman; ditto captured
by an apparatus/shaped by content and context; and the re-
searcher placed between obligations and requirements1
One: The Pure Observer – The philosopher Peter Sloterdijk (2012 [2010]) out-
lines the ‘near-death’ conditions for creating the historical agent of a particular kind
of knowing. The ‘pure observer’ practises a profession dedicated to theory in a life
that must be seen as ascetic. This kind of knowledge requires ‘bracketing’, a sort
of suspended animation (hence ‘near-death’) defined as abstention from judgement
but also real life. By ‘stepping back’ from existential involvement, the pure observer
allows the ‘phenomenalization’ of things in a process that invests the objects of con-
sciousness with meaning, making phenomena present in the sphere of understanding.
In an exercise of abstaining from judgement, consciousness temporarily keeps real
existence at bay. The term ‘epoche’, borrowed from the Greek sceptics, denotes this
‘bracketing’.
How can the bracketing of objects arising from life, and their replacement by stable
logical objects (that is, ideas) in consciousness, be plausible? Sloterdijk proffers an
explanation that encompasses political and epistemic developments. After the ancient
Greek polis collapsed, the brilliant individual no longer needed a political afterworld
to live on in the memory. Knowledge, gathered from the external world, became
internalized and then transcendent, entailing a retreat from profane (or external) life.
Knowledge became the noetic (knowing) soul’s memory of itself and its transcendent
origin. This ‘beautiful death’ exchanged a small subjectivity for the ‘great soul’.
Sloterdijk sees the idea of cosmopolitanism, arising with the Cynics and proclaiming
that thinkers were citizens of the universe, as part of this sort of transcendence. But
later, ‘cognitive modernism’ brought about the assassination of the neutral observer.
As a result of the secularization of cognitive processes, the ‘pure observer’ is dead
(2012, pp. 4-5).
Some points here recall Daston and Galison on the rise of the scientists and es-
pecially the comment about objectivity and subjectivity. Subjectivity appears here
1These categories and arguments were aired in Josephides (2017).
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to be the sacrifice, in return for the ‘great soul’ – that is, death. The sacrifice of
subjectivity is death.
Two: The Thinking Man/Woman – In a very short introduction to The Ac-
companiment , the anthropologist Paul Rabinow describes the creation of Herr Ke-
uner. The scant two pages draw on a collection of very short stories, some of them
mere aphorisms, by the German poet and dramatist Bertolt Brecht as interpreted by
Brecht’s philosopher friend, Walter Benjamin. Rabinow cites two of these short sto-
ries. The moral point made in the second story catches Rabinow’s interest: ‘He who
bears knowledge has the virtue of bearing it as well as having the obligation to care for
the knowledge and the bearing of it’ (2011, p. 3). The thinking man is justly angry,
comments Rabinow, when the virtue of knowledge is devalued through indifference.
Rabinow traces the genealogy of the ‘thinking man’ back to Socrates and the care of
the self (melete and the creation of the historical agent of knowledge). He exempli-
fies the virtues of holding knowledge in respect and recognizing its obligations; he is
serious, precise and meticulous, and he practices care of the self. He demonstrates
that ethics is not just a matter of attentiveness to others, but also attentiveness to
the self.
Three: The Thinking Man/Woman Captured by an Apparatus/Shaped
by Content and Context – The philosopher Giorgio Agamben considers living
beings as being partitioned into two classes: living beings and apparatuses (what
Foucault calls ‘dispositif’). Agamben asks: ‘What is an Apparatus?’ Answer: it is a
‘heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regula-
tory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, moral and phil-
anthropic propositions’; in other words, a set of strategies of the relations of forces
supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge (2009, p. 2). The apparatus
has a concrete strategic function and is located ‘at the intersection of power relations
and relations of knowledge’ (2009, p. 3). Living beings are ‘incessantly captured’ in
these apparatuses that ‘seek to govern and guide them toward the good’ (2009, p.
13).
Agamben’s discussion captures the idea of the knower as shaped simultaneously
by what is known and the context of knowing. As every apparatus implies a process
of subjectification, the operation of the apparatuses as a network of discourses goes
towards clarifying how the conditions of knowing can create different kinds of know-
ers in different social, cultural, epistemic and political milieus at different historical
times, thus linking this paragraph to the two above. Only the paragraph below, on
obligations and requirements, describes conditions of knowing that are shared by all
knowers at all times.
Four: The Researcher Placed Between Obligations and Require-
ments – In her extensive work on cosmopolitics, the philosopher Isabelle Stengers
considers the mechanics of knowledge practices as constituted by two types of ex-
change: a circulating one (the obligations of ethics, which acknowledge the ethical
moment of their formation) and one leading to closure (the requirements of knowl-
edge itself as epistemology, seeking recognition for its achievements). Anthropologists
experience this divergent pull particularly strongly in the different stages of fieldwork
and writing up; the ethnography provides ‘us’ with a knowledge of others, yet the re-
lationship with those others ‘appears only in the service of the science that produces
it’ (Stengers, 2011, p. 305). Such knowledge practices assume a difference in kind
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between ‘us’ and the ‘others’, ‘as expressed in the possibility “we” claim of judging
“others” in terms of beliefs without ever encountering them’ (ibid.). (Ethnographers
clearly do encounter the ‘others’, so the reference here is to the further dissemination
of that knowledge, as for instance described by Rabinow following the exit from the
field – see next section below.) While obligations refer to field-type relations (which
usually do not end with exit from the field), requirements relate to the knowledge
questions themselves: whether they tackle the research questions, use appropriate
forms of evidence, and can be broadened beyond the field situation. The figure of the
diplomat is a good one for elucidating these contrasts.
Like the diplomat, the practitioner of a science for which “the con-
ditions of the production of knowledge for one are, inevitably, also the
conditions for the production of existence for the other” should situate
herself at the intersection of two regimes of obligation: the obligation to
acknowledge that the dreams of those she studies, their fears, their doubts,
and their hopes, pass through her, and the obligation to “report” what she
has learned from them to others, to transform it into an ingredient in the
construction of knowledge. (Stengers, 2011, p. 377)
In approaching knowledge practices simultaneously as having scholarly requirements
and obligations, the ethnographer faces an invidious task. She/he must connect with
the conditions of the local culture during fieldwork in a ‘circulating exchange’ (‘par-
ticipant observation’) that abides by the obligations of knowledge. But as a scholar
she/he must achieve a degree of closure and contextualize herself/himself within the
written corpus of the discipline in order to formulate and communicate what she
has learned, in an account that avoids constructing universals or being subsumed by
them, but instead retains its specificity and integrity. These are the requirements of
knowledge, its internal necessity of a kind of ‘closure’ needed for the production of
knowledge as a coherent unit. Since they entail both translation and interpretation,
they contain the seeds of betrayal. For Stengers, this risk is not confined to anthropol-
ogists but is the fate of all practitioners of the sciences of contemporaneity, who share
the same temporality with those about whom they produce knowledge. In continuing
to translate, the anthropologist, like the diplomat, risks betrayal.
Marilyn Strathern (Josephides et al., 2015, pp. 191-223) suggests a way out of
this quandary. She reminds us that knowledge exchange is all about transformation.
Rather than seeing the pair ‘obligations and requirements’ as having contradictory
pulls, she recontextualizes them as ‘two modes of responsibility, recognizing both the
reaching out entailed in any study and its counterpart in an orientation to an end
product’, neither excluding ethics. She notes that following ‘the detached nature
of any specific object of enquiry’, the knowledge produced by that enquiry likewise
becomes detached and enables us to create something else. Thus the requirement of
knowledge ‘precipitates its own context’ and in this it starkly identifies detachment
as a necessary aspect of knowledge creation.
This detachment is part of what I understand as the requirement of knowledge (on
attachments and detachment, see also Latour, 2004; 2010). The requirements/obliga-
tions pair is not envisaged as a simple opposition between exchanges that are open and
circulating (good) or seemingly closed off (bad); they are two modes of responsibility.
Does this understanding entirely satisfy qualms about betrayal? Different weighting
108 J. Knowl. Struct. Syst., 1:1
Original research The Ethics of Knowledge Creation L. JOSEPHIDES
may still be allocated to each of the pair. The difference may be seen this way: one
mode of responsibility (‘requirement’) prioritizes the requirements of knowledge itself,
while the other locks the anthropologist in relations and contextualizations within the
local culture. Kristen Hastrup (1995) offers a useful insight when she contrasts au-
thenticity with a concern with audience (or reader) understanding. She comments
that the former expresses loyalty to the ‘source’ (the people studied), while the lat-
ter betrays the source by inviting readers to become co-builders of knowledge. The
difficulty of remaining true to both the source and the audience captures the mean-
ing of the distinction between ‘obligations’ and ‘requirements’. A more poignant and
nuanced reading is found in Andrew Moutu’s (2015) reflections on an ethnographic
study in his own country of Papua New Guinea (though not his cultural area). The
exercise of translation and interpretation here arouses conflicting emotions which are
felt especially keenly by scholars who are both ethnographers and subjects of study.
Strathern’s recontextualization of the obligations/requirements pair as ‘two modes
of responsibility’ encourages me to revisit Ingold’s harsh assessment, mentioned in an
earlier section of this paper, of ethnography as turning participant observation into
qualitative data ‘to be analysed in terms of an exogenous body of theory’ (2013, pp.
4-5). I chafe somewhat at the words ‘exogenous body of theory’, having argued in my
own monograph that I did not take Aristotle to the Kewa, they handed him back to
me through their life stories (Josephides, 2008b). But of course I found Aristotle at
the end of my analysis, not an analysis by a Kewa person.
7 Beyond Primary Sites: Knowledge as Demands
of the Day (and Possibility of Betrayal)
Rabinow and Stavrianakis’ Demands of the Day offers seminal discussion on ‘second
order participant observation’, after the exit from the field, when the knowledge de-
veloped no longer relies directly on ‘the field’ represented by a contributing set of
actors (‘informants’) (2013, Preface). Two terms came to exemplify a contrastive set
of relations as experienced in this second-order setting, which followed the authors’
participant observation with bioscientists: collaboration and cooperation. The au-
thors sought collaboration, which required a minimum of common definitions, but
after many frustrating exchanges they had to make do with cooperation, an expecta-
tion only of ‘demarcated labor with regular exchange’ (Rabinow et al., 2013, p. 6).
Though collaboration was blocked, the authors, if they were to respond to the call of
their ‘daemon’, could not abandon ‘flourishing’ as a metric of science as a vocation
(ibid., p. 6). The term ‘daemon’ – traced back to Socrates – stands for a ‘task-master’
who demands a job be well-done according to its own standards, leading to flourishing
or a ‘well-lived life’. Responding to Foucault’s claim that ‘equipment is the transfor-
mation of logos into ethos’, ethos being a conceptual, political and ethical process
of self-formation or an attitude, Rabinow saw care of the self as not just a state of
consciousness but also an activity, ‘an essential aspect of how a moral existence had
to be lived’ (Rabinow, 2003, p. 10).
Knowledge as demands of the day, argue Rabinow and Stavrianakis (taking up
Max Weber’s notion) are no longer primarily about the relations of fieldwork and the
knowledge produced there, but about how one exits from the field. They describe this
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exit as a ‘gathering’, when ethnographers ‘recuperate and curate’ (2013, p. 47) by
taking up the objects from the fieldwork and working through them, away from the
direct experiences of participant observation. They create a narrative by ‘turning ob-
jects into artifacts and artifacts into terms’ (2013, pp. 49, 51). This process is similar
to the one I describe as ‘virtual returns’, defined as the impact of fieldwork ‘recollected
in tranquillity’ on what is considered to be ethnographic evidence (Josephides, 2008a;
the method was used by William Wordsworth in his poetry). Rabinow and Stavri-
anakis argue that following the relationships and obligations as they are transferred
from the field is a kind of ‘phenomenology of the logic of anthropological inquiry’
(2013, p. 98). This being collaborative work, loyalties and communities were of a
different kind from those of the ‘lone ethnographer’.
The awareness of the ‘relations between knowledge and care in terms of mutual
flourishing’ challenged the authors to design a model of collaboration that would
contribute to flourishing. The blockages they experienced forced an existential real-
ization on them – that ‘contemporary anthropology did not begin or end either with
fieldwork or with anything resembling traditional ethnography’ – yet post-fieldwork
participant observation and writing up have barely been addressed in the disciplinary
literature (Rabinow et al., 2013, pp. 5-7). Despite the lack of collaboration in this
case, the authors insist that ‘knowledge-seekers whose knowledge achieves any degree
of authority do not work alone’ (ibid., p. 86). The challenge is to move to an anthro-
pology of the contemporary, which is ‘anthropological and not ethnographic in that
it attends not directly to the present but rather only to the doubly curated objects
and artifacts originally taken from the present’ (ibid., p. 104). It is not enough to
remain ‘open’ to everything, because openness diminishes the capacity to follow a
logic of inquiry from the present and the actual to the contemporary (ibid., p. 105).
A degree of openness is required during fieldwork, but second-order participation and
observation require different techniques and have greater need of asceticism (through
equipment, meditation, etc). Ethics and epistemology may be inseparable, but collab-
oration and cooperation, roughly corresponding to obligations and requirements, are
not both available in all relations of knowledge exchange. Nonetheless, knowledge-
seekers whose knowledge achieves any degree of authority do not work alone. The
anthropology of the contemporary attends to the doubly curated objects and artifacts
originally taken from the present; thus it is anthropological and not ethnographic and
needs different strategies.
In a suggestive table (Rabinow et al., 2013, p. 102) the authors set out the differ-
ences between ‘Research’ and ‘Work’ as a way to examine how logos and ethos, stand-
ing for knowledge and ethics, might be compounded’ (ibid., p. 101). The two-column
chart aligns/opposes two sets of descriptions, not unlike Agamben’s apparatuses in
their heterogeneity. One set represents current anthropological practices; the other
outlines the requirements of an anthropology of the contemporary, towards which
anthropology must move if it is to keep up with the demands of the day. The pairs
that are directly relevant to the current argument are: morality and procedure ver-
sus equipment; method versus meditation (care); individualism versus collaboration;
ethnography versus second-order participant observation; and reconstruction versus
narrative modes. In the first column, morality, method, individualism, ethnography
and reconstruction describe ‘research’ or fieldwork in its ‘traditional’ form. In the
second column, equipment, meditation (care), collaboration, second-order participant
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observation and narrative modes describe ‘work’ in the anthropology of the contem-
porary. Morality and method give way to equipment and meditation (care) in the
move from ‘research’ to the ‘work’ of the anthropology of the contemporary.
In the second-order anthropology of the contemporary, what does it mean to re-
place morality with equipment, and method with meditation (care)? It would bode
well if Enlightenment had been achieved, and human beings had reached their se-
niority and were responsible (Kant, [1784] 1983; Nietzsche, various; Foucault, 1984).
‘Equipment’ is not the same as the apparatuses described by Agamben, which are
largely enforced from the outside, but a set of ethical practices developed and de-
signed according to the needs of the work (Rabinow & Stavrianakis, 2013, p. 17).
An additional distinction that may notionally be added to the table (ibid., p. 102) is
‘bricolage’ on the side of ‘research’, and ‘engineering’ on the side of ‘work’. Research
is cold; work is hot. The second case (replacing method with meditation (care)) also
points to such Enlightenment seniority having been achieved.
The exit from the field is at the same time an entry into a different field, with its
own network of obligations. Here we have colleagues– scholars, fellow anthropologists
– engaged in the creation of a mutually constitutive world. The contemporary is said
to be anthropological and not ethnographic, ‘in that it attends not directly to the
present’ but to the ‘doubly curated objects and artifacts originally taken from the
present’ (ibid., p. 104). (It is worth noting, however, that layers of relations are
congealed in all knowledge.) What the authors neglect here is a discussion of how the
curated objects parallel a transformed self (ibid., p. 105), an operation that has been
well described in the case of the traditional ethnographic self. Nonetheless, the authors
are aware of the need to specify a mode of subjectivation for the anthropologist, as
the ‘thinking man/woman’.
The setting out of this new field of the anthropology of the contemporary answer-
ing to the demands of the day is necessary and to be applauded. It should be assumed
that anthropological ‘research’ and ‘work’ will be carried out in tandem. The latter
may be a second research for a more seasoned researcher and the two neat columns
in the table may sometimes become blurred. Ethical aspects, especially as outlined
in Stengers’ distinction between obligations and requirements, may need more atten-
tion. Changing context is a sort of closure, engaging in relationships with different
others and acquiring new team-building. But the new distinction between cooper-
ation and collaboration alerted Rabinow et al. to the particular kind of closure of
limited exchange. The authors may have realised that scholars in the humanities and
social sciences exhibit a different spirit of collaboration, or understand collaborative
practices differently. Closure is actually an opening up to different relationships, an
entry into another field, whether this is virtual (Josephides, 2008a), an ‘open-ended
comparative and critical enquiry’ (Ingold, 2013, pp. 6, 4), or another meta-level or
register (Rabinow et al., 2013).
8 Conclusion
The main aim of this paper has been to trace the creation of persons as knowers.
What makes them ethical in their very essence and construction? I considered, his-
torically and in terms of professional, personal and human relations, how knowers
and knowledge developed in tandem with the current ‘demands of the day’, under-
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stood as the calls issuing from the practical and epistemological contexts of those
knowledge-creation relations. In the case of anthropology, ethnographers in the field
proceeded as in Stengers’ description of the primatologist, attentive to the questions
posed by those they were observing, ‘because [they] demanded it of them in order to
be well-studied’ (Stengers et al., 2014, p. 37). The exigencies of the profession made
good scientific practice (2014, p. 38).
The paper identifies four types of knowers on a historical and epistemological con-
tinuum. The ‘pure observer’, stepping back from existential involvement, sacrifices
subjectivity in return for the ‘great soul’ of death. The ‘serious thinker’ bears knowl-
edge in full awareness of the grave responsibility of bearing it, but equally aware of
the importance of ‘care of the self’. The knower who is ‘captured by an apparatus’ is
shaped simultaneously by what is known and the form and context of knowing, thus
is contextualised in and subjectivised by a network of discourses in different social,
cultural, epistemic and political milieus at different historical times. The knower who
recognises the ‘obligations and requirements’ of knowledge as two modes of responsi-
bility entailed in two types of exchange and two types of attachment and detachment,
rather than representing a split between ethics and epistemology, describes conditions
of knowing that are shared by all knowers at all times, and necessary for knowledge
to be taken forward.
The problematic question of how to take knowledge forward is particularly relevant
for the anthropology of the contemporary, which places itself beyond primary sites.
Second-order fieldwork involves ‘curating the past’, in a procession, development and
layering that surely merely names the sedimentation of all knowledge. But does this
sedimentation imply or contain the seeds of betrayal? If so, betrayal is an inevitable
accompaniment of knowledge creation. Or is faithfulness merely transferred or ex-
panded to other objects and relations, creating not only doubly but multiply curated
objects and artifacts, all originally taken from their present (a present also made up
of a curated, sedimented past. . . ). As Rabinow et al. (2013) write, anthropology does
not begin or end with fieldwork of traditional ethnography, and exiting the primary
field does not have to entail betrayal. In implicit opposition to Ingold’s comment
cited earlier in this paper, Rabinow et al. argue that it is not enough to remain ‘open’
to everything, because openness diminishes the capacity to follow a logic of inquiry
from the present and the actual to the contemporary (ibid., p. 105). Second-order
participation and observation require different techniques and have greater call for an
‘asceticism’ which places the self of the researcher in question.
Knowledge exchange is full of ethical pitfalls. To paraphrase Strathern (Josephides
et al., 2015, p. 198): Our citations allow us to put persons together as authors, just
like our ethnographies ‘invent’ cultures; while remaining ‘true’ to the author or the
people we study, the rules of ethnographic writing and citation enable us to create
something else, and the detachment involved in all these processes is a necessary aspect
of knowledge creation. Strathern cites ‘incomplete knowledge’ and a good awareness
of the consequences and entailments of speaking as the biggest deterrents to feeling
free to be a critic. The bar she sets for the ‘requirements of verifiable knowledge’ is
so high that it becomes clear that what is at issue is the moral right to speak at all
in certain circumstances. The role of ethics, then, stretches beyond the primary site
of knowledge-production.
A final comment concerns how relations of knowledge exchange may confer or with-
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hold ‘rights to speak’. At first sight this might seem ‘meta-ethical’ or even strategic
in character. It recalls Rapport’s question (Josephides et al., 2015, p. 213) about
whether there are some truths that ought not to be enunciated. But on closer in-
spection layers of conundrums interpose themselves: ‘the right to speak’ the truth
too easily assumes that the truth can be known unequivocally, whereas in reality it
is embroiled in rights and perspectives from the outset. The many layers result in
plural obligations, imposed by what is being studied, by those participating in the
study at all levels and stages and by the complex responses called forth from our own
humanity. The thinking man/woman bears the obligation to care for the knowledge
at all times.
Lest we rest too easily on eloquent arguments, Jeganathan’s paper cited earlier,
returns us to sobering thoughts. Jeganathan (2005) describes how the person of the
anthropologist, as an ‘investigative self’ in places of torture, is created as a particular
kind of knower because of his or her ethical construction there. This relationship is
built entirely on trust, and is the only one that can confer the right to speak. Rights
to speak are wrung out of relationships of trust.
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